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This study examined whether differences in the endorsement of the ‘Protestant Work Ethic’ 
(PWE) are related to motivation losses in group work. Three factors were derived from male 
student scores on the Mirels–Garrett Protestant Work Ethic Scale, Ho’s Australian Work Ethic 
Scale and a scale designed to assess preferences for reward distributions: instrumental value of 
work, ethical value of work and normative value of equity. The study assessed motivation loss in 
two situations; one designed to promote free-rider effects and another designed to promote 
sucker effects. Results showed that the sucker effect was moderated by all three factors but in 
qualitatively different ways whereas the free rider effect was not strongly moderated by any of 
the PWE factors. 
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Many important tasks cannot be completed by 
single individuals, but can only be accomplished 
by groups. Many tasks in organizations require 
members of teams to pool their individual con-
tributions in order to reach the group goal (e.g. 
Antoni, 1994). However, teamwork does not 
always work out as intended. In some instances, 
the group product is satisfying; in other instances, 
the group is far from achieving their productive 
potential.
The failure of groups to realize their poten-
tial group productivity has been thoroughly 
investigated and is a well established fi nding. 
Decreased productivity can be the result of co-
ordination losses, but it is also a result of effort 
reduction stemming from motivation losses 
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(Latane, Williams, & Harkins, 1979; Steiner, 
1972). One proposed reason for motivation losses 
is that individuals might realize that their con-
tribution cannot be identifi ed and thus evaluated 
(Harkins & Jackson, 1985). Furthermore, group 
members may perceive their contributions as 
dispensable and hence reduce their effort while 
free-riding on the contributions of the others 
(Kerr & Bruun, 1983). These explanations assume 
that the basic motivation of each individual 
cannot be intrinsic to working per se or to maxi-
mize the group’s utility. It is rather assumed that 
the basic motivation of each individual consists in 
maximizing individual utility, hence maximizing 
the individual input–output ratio, an assumption 
underlying neoclassical economics.
Group work can be viewed as a social dilemma 
(Kerr, 1983) inasmuch as the strategy ‘not to con-
tribute to the group product’ dominates the 
strategy ‘to contribute’, no matter what the other 
group members are doing. However if no one 
contributes, the collective is worse off as the 
group does not produce. In other words, group 
members have an incentive to defect as long as 
their contributions are additive and the mem-
bers’ main aim is to achieve a maximal individual 
outcome. But pursuing that strategy is not 
conducive to group productivity, and hence in 
confl ict with the collective interest.
The products of groups have an enormous 
significance in our lives. In the past, when 
manufacturing was the predominant industry, 
the pooling of physical effort was important. 
More recently, as more jobs are generated in the 
knowledge industry, joint effort in cognitive tasks 
has gained in importance. Examples of collect-
ive effort on cognitive tasks include writing 
a joint report, developing a commercial com-
puter program, or operating an air traffi c control 
system. In addition, globalization is leading to 
faster moving societies and changing traditional 
values. Values like modesty, diligence and honesty 
have the taste of being old-fashioned, while 
self-actualization, pursuing a career and cultivat-
ing a healthy narcissism are on the agenda 
(e.g. Hogan & Blake, 1996). If the spirit of the 
21st century is dominated by pursuing one’s own 
individual goals, and on the other hand, team 
work is important, then an issue arises as to what 
types of people can work effectively in teams. 
In the current research, we address the issue 
of whether all individuals are equally inclined 
to loaf in collective work, or whether there is a 
way to differentiate systematically team workers 
from team loafers. After all, when team work is 
so important, a way to identify those who still 
exert effort in groups would seem important 
for all concerned. Before we turn to the specifi c 
question of what motivates people to contribute 
to a group product, we will briefl y summarize the 
social psychological explanations for reduced 
group productivity.
Motivation losses in group work
Since the discovery and analysis of the Ringelmann 
effect (see Ingham, Levinger, Graves, & Peckham, 
1974; Kravitz & Martin, 1986; Moede, 1927), 
we know that group work compared to indi-
vidual work often results in productivity losses. 
Latane et al. (1979) showed that the decreased 
productivity is caused both by coordination 
loss and by effort reduction. They interpreted 
the effort reduction as a result of motivation 
losses and called it ‘social loafi ng’. With emerg-
ing research the phenomenon of motivation 
losses in groups has been given different labels 
depending on the circumstantial conditions. 
Social loafi ng  stems from the realization that 
the individual contribution cannot be iden-
tifi ed and thus evaluated (Harkins & Jackson, 
1985). The potential for evaluation can come 
from other group members, external sources (e.g. 
the experimenter), or from the possibility for 
self-evaluation, and any of these can eliminate the 
effect (Harkins & Szymanski, 1989; Szymanski & 
Harkins, 1987). Free-riding stems from the 
perception that the individual’s contribution is 
dispensable, even if it is identifi able and apprais-
able (Kerr & Brunn, 1983; for a detailed analysis 
of task type and possible motivation losses in 
the framework of social dilemmas, see also 
Arnscheid, Diehl & Stroebe, 1997). The sucker-
effect results from the perception that others 
are free-riding on one’s contributions or efforts 
(Orbell & Dawes, 1981). In this case it is the 
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potential of the averseness of this role, which 
makes the individual reduce his/her effort. 
Kerr (1983) argues that the violation of certain 
social norms like the equity norm, the norm of 
reciprocity and the norm of social responsibil-
ity make the sucker role uncomfortable. In the 
last decade motivation losses in group perform-
ance have been linked to general theories of 
motivation (Karau & Williams, 1993; Shepperd, 
1993; Shepperd & Taylor, 1999).
The proposed underlying mechanism for the 
free-rider effect and social loafi ng are based on 
the assumption that individuals’ main driving 
force is to maximize individual outcomes while 
minimizing input. The proposed underlying 
mechanism for the sucker-effect is, in a sense, 
distinct from the other two, as it is based on the 
assumption that behavior can also be driven by 
other motives and needs like feeling socially 
equal and accepted. An obvious question is 
whether other motives, as for instance seeing 
work as something valuable per se, may play 
important roles in group work also. 
What moderates motivation losses in 
group work
Karau and Williams’ (1993) meta-analytic re-
view concludes that motivation losses in group 
work is a robust phenomenon which generalizes 
across tasks and populations. Above we have 
briefl y mentioned variables that play a role in 
the underlying processes of motivation losses 
in groups. Among those, evaluation potential, 
expectations of coworker performance, task 
meaningfulness and culture were found to have 
a consistent impact (Karau & Williams, 1993). 
Moreover, individual differences have also 
been shown to moderate motivation losses in 
groups. Need for cognition refers to the tend-
ency to engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive 
endeavors (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). Smith, Kerr, 
Markus, and Stasson (2001) demonstrated that 
the need for cognition can moderate motivation 
losses in group work: individuals high in need 
for cognition worked equally hard on a vigilance 
task, regardless of whether they were working 
collectively or coactively. Individuals low in need 
for cognition, however, exerted considerably less 
effort when working collectively compared to 
working coactively.
Hart, Karau, Stasson, and Kerr (2004) showed 
that people high in achievement motivation 
exerted equal effort whether they were work-
ing coactively or collectively and whether they 
expected the other person to exert high or low 
effort. However, people low in achievement 
motivation reduced their effort most when 
working collectively with somebody from whom 
they expected high effort. Hence, apparently they 
reduced their effort when they perceived their 
contribution as dispensable and not identifi able. 
However, what is not clear in their study is how 
participants interpreted the allegedly predicted 
effort of their team member. When induced to 
expect low effort, participants received the mes-
sage that their team partner found the task 
very interesting but was not going to exert 
much effort on it. This message is ambiguous. 
Participants could have attributed the reduced 
effort of their partner to their lack of willingness 
or of capability. Neither of these attributions is 
compelling. On the one hand, why would some-
body reduce effort on a task that she/he fi nds 
interesting? On the other hand, why would lack 
of ability lead to a reduction of effort?  More-
over, the source of attribution for the reduced 
effort plays an important role in social loafi ng. 
Reduced input from a team member due to 
lack of ability evokes quite different reactions 
than reduced effort due to a lack of willingness 
(Kerr, 1983).
As noted above, previous research has shown 
that need for cognition and achievement motiv-
ation moderate reduction of effort in collective 
work. However, effects of these moderators would 
not differ depending on whether a partner’s 
reduced effort stemmed from unwillingness 
or inability. People high in need for cognition 
or achievement motivation would sustain their 
effort regardless of the reason for the partner’s 
reduced effort. In these cases, the enjoyment of 
the task (need for cognition) or the desire to 
achieve are not dampened by a partner’s lack of 
motivation or ability. However, beliefs regarding 
the value of work and the importance of equity 
should moderate one’s reactions to a partner 
and her/his reasons for reducing effort.
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 11(1)
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The Protestant Work Ethic
In 1905 Max Weber published ‘The Protestant 
ethic and the spirit of capitalism’. The basic idea 
was that the Protestant ethic was an important 
factor in the economic success of Protestant 
groups in the early stages of capitalism. Worldly 
success was interpreted as a sign of righteousness 
and therefore vigorously pursued. Since Weber, 
anthropologists, economists, sociologists, his-
torians and psychologists have been interested 
in the issue of the Protestant Work Ethic (PWE). 
Psychologists were not concerned with whether 
Weber was right or wrong but translated the con-
cept into an individual difference construct.
McClelland (1961) was the fi rst to use the con-
cept of PWE within psychology. His explanation 
for the association between Protestantism 
and capitalism was the following. Parents, who 
have internalized Protestant values, reared their 
children in ways that foster independence, 
rationality and delay of gratifi cation. Instilling 
these values produces children with a high 
achievement motivation, and people with a 
high achievement motivation are very likely 
to contribute to the expansion of business. He 
subsumed the concept of PWE under need for 
achievement. Placing PWE in this conceptual 
context has been criticized because it emphasizes 
only the ‘hard work-aspect’ of the work ethic and 
leaves out other aspects. Nonetheless, the idea 
that high achievement motivation is a relatively 
stable disposition which has its roots in early 
socialization led others to construe PWE be-
liefs as an individual difference of conceptual 
interest. The research focus shifted from the 
etiology of the PWE to the measurement of the 
construct and to its relationships to behavior 
patterns and other belief systems. Several self-
report measures were developed (e.g. Blood, 
1969; Buchholz, 1976; Goldstein & Eichhorn, 
1961; Hammond & Williams, 1976; Ho, 1984; 
Mirels & Garrett, 1971; Ray, 1982). Using these 
measures, PWE has been shown to correlate with 
behaviors and other constructs. Persons with 
a high PWE are industrious, ambitious, hard 
working and intrinsically motivated (Furnham, 
1990a), stemming from the attitude that work 
will and should pay off. They tend to have an 
internal locus of control in matters that are 
linked to work (Lied & Pritchard, 1976) and 
are not easily affected by external factors. Their 
behavioral orientation in a free-choice period is 
to work equally hard on the task regardless of the 
performance feedback (Furnham, 1990a). More-
over, they are inclined to apply an equity norm, 
as opposed to an equality norm, in deciding how 
to distribute a resource (Greenberg, 1978).
Equity norm refers to a proportional input–
output relation. People perceive a distribution 
as fair when their own ratio of inputs to outputs 
equals the input–output ratio of others. Put 
differently, according to equity norm, rewards 
should be distributed in direct proportion to 
the effort each group member exerts (Adams, 
1965; Walster, Berscheid & Walster, 1973). 
In contrast to that, the equality norm does not 
focus on the input–output relation in deter-
mining whether justice or injustice is perceived, 
but merely on an equal size of the output. Hence, 
the equality norm would suggest an equal 
distribution of rewards irrespective of inputs 
(Homans, 1958, 1961).
The relationships among components 
of PWE, free-riding and being 
the sucker
The purpose of the current study is to investigate 
the PWE as a moderator of motivation losses in 
group work. Heaven (1989) as well as Furnham 
(1990b) delivered empirical evidence that 
the global construct ‘PWE’ consists of several 
components. Thus different components might 
be responsible for the behavioral correlates and 
associations with other personality constructs 
and attitudes, which were described above. For 
example, a high work ethic is associated with a 
preference for the equity norm and the belief 
in the instrumental value of work (‘work should 
and does pay off’) and the belief in the ethical 
value of work (‘it is ethical to be occupied with 
work’); whereas people with a low work ethic are 
extrinsically motivated and prefer the equality 
norm when asked to divide a reward, and do not 
believe in the ethical value of work (Furnham, 
1990a; Greenberg, 1978). The implication is 
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that PWE is a global construct that includes 
distinct components: a belief in the long-range 
instrumental value of work, a belief in the 
ethical value of work and a preference for equity 
(as opposed to equality) in the distribution of 
resources.
These components—the preference for an 
equity norm and beliefs about the instrumental 
and ethical value of work—are relevant to the 
reactions one has to others’ efforts in collective 
work. The free-riding effect occurs, when indi-
viduals realize that their contribution to the 
group product is dispensable while they can 
nevertheless benefi t from the group product. 
That is, the free-rider effect is due to maximizing 
the individual cost–benefi t ratio by reducing 
effort. On the one hand, for people who have 
internalized the ethical value of work and the 
conviction that work has a long-range instru-
mental value, working hard should have a high 
value regardless of the immediate outcome. On 
the other hand, people who subscribed to equity 
principles should also not reduce effort at the 
expense of others. Thus, all of the components of 
PWE should immunize one against the tendency 
to free ride. Therefore participants with a high 
PWE should not show the free-rider effect, 
whereas participants with a low PWE should 
show the free-rider effect.
The sucker-effect occurs when individuals 
perceive the danger that others may free-ride 
on their contributions. Thus, a potential vio-
lation of the equity norm is responsible for 
motivation loss. In group work, the reward system 
is often such that a group product is divided 
equally among all group members; hence, the 
equality principle is followed in the distribution 
of reward for performance. As a consequence, 
once group members perceive that others are 
free-riding, one way to prevent violation of the 
equity norm is to reduce one’s own contributions. 
Thus, people who score high on the equity 
component of PWE should show the sucker-
effect to a higher extent than persons with a 
low PWE equity score. However, if the belief in 
the instrumental values of work prevails, per-
sons with a high work ethic should show the 
sucker effect to a lesser extent. That is, belief 
in the long-range instrumental value of work 
should, as in the free-rider case, make one less 
responsive to the immediate outcomes and thus 
less concerned with the possibility that others 
are free riding. The implications of the ethical 
factor are less clear, however.  On the one hand, 
if one believes that hard work is ethical, then one 
should work hard regardless of what others are 
doing. On the other hand, sucker-effects are a 
reaction to others’ actual or anticipated failures 
to work hard—that is, to behave in an unethical 
manner. When framed this way, continuing to 
work hard in the face of others’ ‘laziness’ rewards 
those who are undeserving. Thus, those who 
subscribe to the ethical value of work may be 
particularly sensitive to being the ‘sucker’. In 
sum, concerning the sucker-effect, contrasting 
predictions can be derived from the concept of 
PWE. Understanding the relationship between 
PWE and susceptibility to the sucker-effect re-
quires that the components of PWE (namely, 
endorsement of the instrumental value and the 
ethical value of work, and preference for equity 
norm) be measured separately.
Hypotheses
All three components of PWE are expected to 
have consistent relationships to free-riding. 
That is, free riding should not occur (or be re-
duced) for participants with high PWE scores 
whereas the effect should be observed strongly 
for participants with low PWE scores.
The predictions regarding the relationships 
among PWE components and the sucker-effect 
are more complicated. Two countervailing 
hypotheses concerning the relationship between 
PWE and the sucker effect are considered. First, 
people who score high on the equity component 
of PWE should exhibit the sucker effect whereas 
those who score low should not. Second, if belief 
in the long-range instrumental value of work 
overrides concerns about being the sucker, the 
reverse pattern should occur: people who score 
low in the instrumental component of PWE 
should exhibit the sucker-effect whereas those 
who score high should not.  Finally, it is not clear 
how people who subscribe to the ethical value of 
hard work will react to being a ‘sucker’. If those 
who believe that hard work is good focus on the 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 11(1)
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implications for themselves, they should not 
exhibit the sucker effect. However, if they focus 
on the implications for the ethics (and perhaps 
deservingness) of others, then they should avoid 
being the sucker because doing so benefi ts the 
‘undeserving’ at one’s own expense. 
Method
Overview
In order to test the research hypotheses, a situ-
ation was designed that permitted free-riding, 
and another situation was designed that made 
participants vulnerable to the sucker-effect. 
Also included were two corresponding control 
conditions. Participants worked in dyads on a 
potentially divisible task. 
In the free-rider condition, participants were 
led to believe that their partner was capable of 
the task by the initial feedback on the task perfor-
mance. In the free-rider control condition, 
participants performed the task individually.
In the sucker effect condition, hereafter referred 
to as the sucker condition, the partner of the par-
ticipant is portrayed as capable by the initial 
feedback on task performance. The feedback 
after the fi rst three trials revealed that the team 
did quite well on the task, but that the par-
ticipant’s contribution consistently exceeded the 
‘partner’s’ contribution. The ‘partner’ of the par-
ticipant was a confederate of the experimenter. In 
order to have the participants really attribute the 
‘partner’s’ smaller contribution to his reduced 
effort and not to lower ability, the confederate 
displayed boredom by scripted behavior. In 
the sucker effect control condition, hereafter 
referred to as the sucker control condition, the 
participant’s contribution exceeded the ‘part-
ner’s’ contribution. But here the participant was 
led to believe by the initial task performance 
feedback that their partner’s task ability was 
low. During the initial trials, the confederate 
commented on the diffi culty of the task.
Participants and design 
Eighty male students from University Col-
lege London participated in the experiment. 
Because of the sex difference in the sucker-
effect (Kerr, 1983) only males were included. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one 
of the four experimental conditions (free-rider, 
free-rider control, sucker or sucker control). 
Thus, the design was a four independent group 
design. 
Measurement of PWE 
The endorsement of the PWE was assessed with 
the Protestant Work Ethic Scale from Mirels & 
Garrett (1971) and the Australian Work Ethic 
Scale from Ho (1984). Despite the theoretical 
inclusion of the equity/equality norm in the 
concept of PWE as a variable of individual dif-
ferences, these scales do not include items that 
measure directly a preference for equity or 
equality. Therefore, nine additional items were 
created to assess the degree to which participants 
endorse the equity norm. Examples of such 
items are: ‘The trouble with giving people equal 
rewards for work is that they very rarely work 
equally hard’ or ‘When a task is completed by a 
team there is nothing wrong with distributing the 
reward equally regardless of unequal input’.
Task
The task that the participants performed in 
three trials was the ‘d2’ concentration test 
(Brickenkamp, 1994). In this test, participants 
are confronted with a sheet full of the letters 
‘d’ and ‘p’ which have one to four lines above 
or beneath them. The task is to work through 
the lines of letters and cross out every ‘d’ that 
has two lines with it. To provide a rationale for 
participants to complete this task in teams and 
to defl ect their attention from our interest in 
individual performance in collective endeavors, 
the following cover story was presented:
This study is about how to design the task of manually 
checking transfer slips most effi ciently. In most 
instances one fi lls in forms nowadays using the com-
puter. However, some service providers, like banks, 
are still obliged to offer other possibilities for clients 
to hand in forms. Service providers let clients also 
use forms, which can be fi lled in by hand, but can 
later be read by a computer. People are instructed 
how to fi ll in these forms, so that the computer can 
read them, but still a given percentage cannot be 
read by the computers. When the computers read 
the forms, the information is translated into a code. 
This code then appears on a screen, and consists 
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of signs and abnormalities. The signs represent 
information from the transfer slip that could be 
read properly, whereas the abnormalities stem 
from information that could not be read properly. 
Somebody has to detect the abnormalities, which 
demands a continuously high concentration and is 
a boring task. A short period of inattention will lead 
to a greater amount of undetected abnormalities, 
which will be noticed in the succeeding processing. 
The study tests whether sharing the task so that the 
code would come up on two screens has an im-
pact. Another feature that the study addresses is 
whether and how much feedback and feedback 
frequencies have an impact on performance. Hence, 
participants will be working on a task, where they 
have to detect abnormal signs in a list of abnormal 
and normal signs (they were doing this either with 
another person or alone) and will be given feedback 
in regular frequencies. 
Procedure 
After arrival participants were asked to com-
plete the PWE questionnaires, which were said 
to be part of a different research project. They 
were then told the alleged purpose of the study 
before they were randomly assigned to one of 
the four conditions. With the exception of 
the free-rider control condition, participants 
were told that they would work at the task as a 
cooperative team and that their performances 
would be summed and they would be rewarded 
for their combined performance regardless 
of their individual contributions. Participants 
were guaranteed £2 as a reward and they were 
told that they could earn up to £3 depending 
on their combined performance. £3 was worth 
approximately US$5. Eventually everybody was 
paid £3. Participants were then made familiar 
with the requirements of the task by practicing on 
a line of letters. During the actual experimental 
trials participants were wearing headphones. 
The command to start was given via these head-
phones. Furthermore, during the trials there 
was offi ce noise in the room in order to prevent 
the participants from overhearing each other’s 
speed. 
The fi rst trial lasted for one minute and par-
ticipants were told that this trial was meant to 
assess their initial ability. The second to the 
fourth trials lasted for two and a half minutes 
each. The experimenter left the room while the 
‘teams’ were actually working on the task. Be-
havior in the room could be monitored through 
a glass window in the door. After each trial the 
experimenter returned, took the sheets from 
the participants and allegedly scored them in 
the same room. 
Participants were told that their feedback 
would compare their performance to the aver-
age performance by other participants. In all 
experimental conditions participants were given 
the feedback after the fi rst trial in which their 
own performance, which was supposedly the 
initial ability, was 20% above average. In the sucker 
condition and the free-rider condition they were told 
that their partner’s performance was 20% above 
average as well, whereas in the control condition 
to the sucker-effect the performance feedback for 
the partner was 5% below average. 
After the fi rst trial in the sucker condition, the 
confederate yawned and stretched and started 
to lean back with his chair while the sheets were 
corrected. After the second trial he again leaned 
backwards and began to drum with his fi ngers 
on the table. The performance feedback then 
revealed a combined result around 20% above 
average and a contribution of the participant to 
the total of about 60%. After the third trial the 
confederate mumbled to himself ‘it’s getting 
boring’, while the experimenter was still outside 
the room. The performance feedback for this 
trial then again revealed a combined result that 
was 20% above average, to which the participant 
had again contributed more than 60%.
In the sucker control condition the confederate 
said after the fi rst trial, ‘I can’t tell them apart’. 
After the second trial he moaned and said to 
himself ‘it is really diffi cult’. The combined re-
sult was said to be 20% above average and the 
contribution of the participant about 60%. After 
the third trial the confederate said ‘not easy’ 
while handing his sheet over to the experimenter. 
Feedback for this trial then revealed the same 
result as for the second trial.
In the free-rider condition participants were 
told after the second and third trials that they 
together achieved 20% above average; no infor-
mation was given concerning the individual 
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contributions to the team performance. In the 
free-rider control condition participants were given 
the feedback that they achieved about 20% above 
average after each trial. 
Feedback was never provided after the fourth 
trial in any of the four experimental conditions. 
After the fourth trial, participants were asked 
to complete a questionnaire that functioned as 
a manipulation check. Participants were then 
debriefed, thanked and paid.
Results
The PWE 
In order to disentangle the components of the 
global construct a principal component factor 
analysis with varimax rotation was conducted 
using all of the items from the questionnaires. 
A scree plot indicated the presence of three fac-
tors. These three factors accounted for 38.6% 
of the variance. The fi rst factor accounted for 
13.23% of the variance. Items loading high on 
this factor portray the attitude that work has a 
moral value. It was therefore called the Ethical 
Factor. The second factor explained 12.9% of 
the variance. Items loading high on this factor 
capture the notion that work should and will 
pay off. It was therefore called the Instrumental 
Factor. The third factor explained 12.5% of 
the variance, and items loading high on this 
factor measure the attitude to the equity prin-
ciple. This factor was called the Equity Factor. 
Examples for items loading high on the re-
spective factors can be found in the Appendix. 
Factor scores were computed to be used later 
as a measure of individual differences on the 
three dimensions.
Analysis of the performance data
Four participants had to be excluded from the 
analysis; one had suspicions about the con-
federate and the other three did not complete 
the task properly. Table 1 reveals the mean 
raw performance scores in all four conditions 
for the four trials. Raw performances are the 
number of all correctly marked signs minus 
all false positives (signs marked which should 
not have been) and misses (unmarked signs 
that should have been marked prior to the last 
correctly marked sign).
The primary dependent variable was perform-
ance on the fourth trial. As depicted in Table 1, 
scores in the fourth trial in the free-rider 
condition (M = 282.26) and in the sucker con-
dition (M = 279.47) were lower than in the 
free-rider control condition (M = 316.8) and in 
the control condition sucker-effect (M = 295.8). 
A one-way analysis of covariance was performed, 
with the performance in the fourth trial as a 
dependent variable, and the performance on 
the fi rst trial as a covariate. The fi rst trial was 
used as a covariate in order to control for indi-
vidual differences in performance before the 
introduction of the experimental manipulations 
and hence reduce error variance. There was 
a main effect of the condition (F(3, 71) = 3.2, 
p < .028). Also the effect of the covariate was 
signifi cant (F(1, 71) = 58,7, p < .001). Table 2 
contains the mean performances adjusted for 
the covariate.
Two contrasts were calculated to test for the 
free-rider effect and the sucker-effect, respect-
ively. The comparison for the free-rider to the 
free-rider control was signifi cant (F(1, 67) = 5.67, 
p < .05). The comparison of the sucker effect 
Table 1. Number of signs participants managed to work on in the different conditions
 Condition 1: Condition 2: Condition 3: Condition 4:
 Free-rider effect Control free-rider effect Sucker-effect Control  sucker-effect
1. Triala 107.58 (17.52) 115.2 (12.53) 106.41 (17.69) 104.5 (18.78)
2. Trial 273.79 (32.69) 287.75 (31.18) 271.24 (43.16) 259.55 (39.99)
3. Trial 280.89 (35.35) 301.95 (30.07) 276.41 (39.38) 279.55 (41.42)
4. Trial 282.26 (40.14) 316.8 (32.58) 279.47 (43.53) 295.8 (41.58)
a Please note that the fi rst trial lasted for one minute only, while the others lasted for 2.5 minutes.
Note: Table entries are means with standard deviations in parentheses.
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condition to its control revealed a signifi cant 
sucker effect (F(1, 67) = 3.978, p < .05).
Sucker and free-rider effects and PWE
A regression analysis was conducted using only 
participants from the sucker control condition 
and the sucker effect condition. The regression 
model used performance on the fourth trial as 
the dependent variable and trial 1 performance, 
sucker effect conditions and scores on the 
original PWE scale as predictors. Also included 
was an interaction term of condition by PWE 
score. All predictors were centered before the re-
gression was conducted. The effect of the trial 1 
performance and sucker condition were signifi -
cant, confi rming the results from the foregoing 
covariance analysis. The interaction of sucker 
condition by score on PWE scale was only mar-
ginally signifi cant (t(32) = 1.58, p > .12). Thus 
the sucker effect was marginally moderated by 
people’s score on the global PWE scale. 
A regression analysis was conducted using only 
participants from the free-rider condition and 
the free-rider control condition. The regression 
model used performance on the fourth trial as 
the dependent variable and trial 1 performance, 
free-rider effect conditions and scores on the 
original PWE scale as predictors. Also included 
was an interaction term of condition by PWE 
score. All predictors were centered before 
the regression was conducted. The effect of the 
trial 1 performance and free rider conditions 
were signifi cant, confi rming the results from the 
covariance analysis. The interactions with the 
PWE score was not signifi cant (t(34) < 1, ns).
Sucker-effect and PWE factors
For each of the PWE factors, a regression an-
alysis was conducted using only participants 
from the sucker control condition and the 
sucker-effect condition. The regression model 
used performance on the fourth trial as the 
dependent variable and trial 1 performance, 
sucker-effect conditions and factor scores as 
predictors. Also included was an interaction 
term of condition by respective factor score. 
All predictors were centered before conducting 
the regression. In all the regressions the effect 
of the trial 1 performance and sucker condition 
were signifi cant, confi rming the results from the 
covariance analysis. The interaction of sucker 
condition by factor score was signifi cant for all 
components: instrumental factors (t(36) = 2.01, 
p > .05), ethical factor (t(36) = 2.19, p < .036) and 
equity factor (t(36) = 2.06, p < .048). Thus the 
sucker-effect was different for people who scored 
high and low on all of the PWE factors. 
To better understand the nature of the 
interactions of PWE factors and the sucker- 
effect, estimated means for people scoring one 
standard deviation above and one standard 
deviation below the mean on each factor were 
obtained using the regression model. These 
estimated means are plotted for participants 
in the experimental sucker and sucker control 
conditions in Figures 1 to 3. 
Participants, who endorsed the idea that work 
should and will pay off, worked almost as hard 
in the sucker control condition (M = 285.09) as 
they did in the sucker experimental condition 
(M = 281.69). But participants who did not see 
work as something that should and will pay 
off worked harder when working with some-
body who was contributing less because of 
ability (M = 306.44), than when working with 
someone who contributed less due to lack of 
effort (M = 272.05). Thus, people endorsing the 
instrumental value of work were not affected by 
being the sucker. They seemed to focus more on 
their part of the work even if the other was not 
working hard. People who believed less in the 
long-range instrumental value of work worked 
harder when their partner was incapable than 
when he was unwilling to exert effort. 
Table 2. Adjusted means in Trial 4
 Condition 1: Condition 2: Condition 3: Condition 4:
 Free-rider effect Control free-rider effect Sucker-effect Control sucker-effect
4. Trial                 283.74 (6.75) 306.19 (6.72) 282.81 (7.15) 302.17 (6.63)
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Endorsement of the ethical value of work 
and of equity produced similar patterns in 
the sucker conditions. When their partner was 
incapable, participants who endorsed the ethical 
value of work (M = 306.84) and who endorsed 
the equity principle (M = 310.32) worked 
harder than those who did not subscribe to the 
ethical value of work (M = 263.18) and to the 
principle of equity (M = 271.4). In contrast, 
participants who did not endorse the ethical 
value of work and participants who subscribed 
to the equality principle exerted about the same 
effort regardless of whether their partner was 
performing poorly due to inability or due to 
lack of trying. So apparently belief in the ethical 
value of work and adherence to the equity 
principle led participants to compensate for an 
incapable partner but to avoid being a sucker. 
Free-rider effect and PWE factors
For each of the PWE factors, a regression an-
alysis was conducted using only participants 
from the free rider condition and the free 
rider control condition. The regression model 
used performance on the fourth trial as the 
dependent variable and trial 1 performance, 
free rider effect conditions and scale score as 
predictors. Also included was an interaction term 
of condition by scale score. All predictors were 
centered before the regression was conducted. 
In all the regressions the effect of the trial 1 
performance and free rider conditions were 
signifi cant, confi rming the results from the 
covariance analysis. The predicted interaction of 
free-rider condition by instrumental scale score 
was only marginally signifi cant (t(38) = 1.49 
p < .07, one-tailed). The interactions with the 
equity and ethical scale were not signifi cant. 
Thus the free-rider effect was marginally dif-
ferent only for people who scored high and low 
on the instrumental component of PWE. The 
estimated means for people scoring one standard 
deviation above and one standard deviation 
below the mean on the instrumental factor were 
obtained using the regression model. These 
estimated means are plotted for participants 
Figure 3. Sucker-effect moderated by individual 
differences in the belief in equity.
Figure 1. Sucker-effect moderated by individual dif-
ferences in the belief in the instrumental value of 
work.
Figure 2. Sucker-effect moderated by individual 
differences in the belief in the ethical value of work.
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in the experimental free-rider and free rider 
control conditions in Figure 4.
Figure 4. Free-rider effect by individual differences in 
the belief in the instrumental value of work.
Participants who believed in the instrumental 
value of work showed no difference in perform-
ance in the free rider control condition 
(M = 312.82) and the free-rider experimental 
condition (M = 307.36). But participants who 
did not believe in the instrumental value of work 
were affected by the situational circumstances in 
their effort exertion. When working alone, they 
worked harder (M = 309.66) than when working 
as a team (M = 262.52) with an allegedly skilled 
person and individual contributions were not 
identifi able.
Discussion
The purpose of this study was to investigate the 
moderating effects of attitudes toward work, as 
embodied in the global construct of the PWE, 
on motivation losses in performance groups. We 
distinguished two types of motivation loss which 
we suggest involve distinctly different psycho-
logical processes. More specifi cally, the sucker-
effect is a reaction to reduced effort by others 
in collective work and, as the name implies, to 
the potential of one’s own effort being exploited 
by others. The free-rider effect is the robust 
tendency to reduce effort in collective work when 
individual contributions are not identifi able. 
Our experimental setup induced both sucker- 
and free-rider effects. When participants were 
working with another individual and their 
individual contributions were combined and un-
identifi able, they produced less than when they 
thought they were working alone—the classic 
free-rider effect. When they were working with 
another person whose output was relatively low, 
they produced less when they thought the other 
person was not trying than when they thought 
the other person was not capable—the classic 
sucker-effect.
Our purpose was to examine whether com-
ponents of PWE moderate the inclinations 
to reduce effort in the free-riding and sucker 
conditions.  Based on past work with PWE (e.g. 
Furnham,1990b; Heaven, 1989), we anticipated 
that the global construct was a combination 
of at least three components: belief that work 
will be rewarded (instrumental component), 
belief that hard work is a marker of righteousness 
(ethical component) and belief that people 
ought to be rewarded equitably for their work 
(equity component). We constructed the gobal 
measure of PWE from items taken from Mirels 
and Garrett (1971) and Ho and Lloyd (1984) and 
added additional items designed to measure 
more preferences for equity in the distribution of 
resources.  We factor analyzed responses to items 
from this global measure and obtained distinct 
factors that corresponded to the anticipated 
components of belief in the ethical value of work, 
the instrumental value of work and the equity 
principle.
Even though they are distinct, conceptually and 
empirically, the factors are strongly correlated 
with the traditional measures of PWE. For 
example the instrumental factor correlated 
.85 with the Ho and Lloyd’s (1984) PWE scale 
and .48 with the PWE scale used by Mirels and 
Garrett (1971). The ethical factor also correlated 
strongly with the Mirels and Garrett scale (r = .74) 
but modestly with the Ho and Lloyd measure 
(r = .27). The equity factor, not surprisingly given 
that it consisted largely of items not contained in 
these traditional measures, correlated modestly 
both with the Mirels and Garrett scale (r = .38) 
and with the Ho and Lloyd scale (r = .27). 
We expected that these components of PWE 
would moderate free-riding and sucker- effects 
in different ways. Concerning the sucker-effect 
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and a potential moderating role of the PWE, 
we had two contrasting hypotheses. On the one 
hand, we speculated that people high in the 
instrumental value component of PWE would 
not show the sucker-effect because of their belief 
that hard work pays off in the long run. On the 
other hand, people who subscribe strongly to 
an equity norm should show the sucker-effect 
in that they would react to the violation of the 
equity norm in a situation where a partner is, by 
choice, coasting. Thus, we did not expect that 
the global measure of PWE would moderate the 
sucker-effect and it did not.
Our expectation regarding the moderating 
infl uence of the instrumental component on the 
sucker-effect was confi rmed. Participants who 
believed in the long-range instrumental value of 
work were not affected by the reasons for their 
partner’s low output. Whether he contributed 
less than the participant due to lack of ability 
or to lack of motivation did not seem to matter 
to them. In contrast, participants who did not 
endorse the instrumental value of work exerted 
more effort when their partner was incapable 
rather than lazy. Somewhat surprisingly, these 
participants who were low on the instrumental 
component actually worked harder when 
paired with an incapable partner than did the 
participants who were high on the instrumental 
component. Thus, it seems that people who 
do not subscribe to the instrumental value of 
work are willing to compensate for a capability 
defi cit, perhaps in order to gain the immedi-
ate incentives for high production. That is, for 
them, work may not lead invariably to rewards 
or be rewarding in itself but, when benefi ts are 
directly tied to collective production, they will 
compensate for less capable coworkers. 
As predicted, participants who endorsed the 
equity principle were affected by the sucker 
manipulations. If their partner provided the 
impression that the participant could become 
the sucker, those who reported a preference for 
equity over equality reduced their effort con-
siderably. In comparison, when they thought 
their team partner was less capable at the 
task, they exerted extra effort to compensate 
for their partner’s defi cits. Apparently it matters 
for people endorsing the equity principle 
why a coworker’s contributions are subpar. If 
poor performance is due to a lack of ability, they 
almost appear to act according to the principle 
that input should be proportional to individual 
resources or ability. If they do not have any 
reason to believe that resources or abilities are 
disproportionate, they are sensitive to the subpar 
contributions of their partner and exert less 
effort. People who are more likely to endorse 
the equality norm do not seem to be affected 
by the reason for their partner’s lesser input. 
If it appears to be lack of motivation or skill, 
it does not seem to affect them. They do not 
endorse the equity norm, and consequently, it 
seems that they do not experience any danger 
of becoming a sucker in the light of a violation 
of such a norm. 
People who see hard work as an ethical marker 
also react to the apparent reasons that a coworker 
is performing poorly. Participants who believed 
in the ethical value of work were affected by the 
apparent cause of their partners’ inferior con-
tributions to the collective product. They, like 
equity endorsers seemed willing to compensate 
for lack of ability. However, they reduced their 
input when the partner was loafi ng. Thus, the 
ethical value that people see in work is not simply 
self-focused (i.e. ‘If I work hard, I am good’) but 
also other-focused (i.e. ‘Lazy people are bad’). 
In other words, people who believe in the ethical 
value of work have a broader moral concern. 
When they are working with somebody who does 
not seem to spend much effort on the task, they 
are not willing to compensate for the other’s 
lack of effort and, in the spirit of defending 
their moral claim, are prepared to forego 
part of their reward. Hence defending their 
moral claim seems more important than the 
external reward. People who do not believe in 
the ethical value of work, have less of a mission 
to defend some ethical principle, and hence do 
not appear to experience great psychological 
costs if another person might free-ride on their 
effort. Consequently they exerted the same 
effort, no matter whether the other person was 
incapable or not motivated.
Contrary to our predictions, the global PWE 
measure did not moderate the free-rider effect. 
Moreover, the free rider effect was only weakly 
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related to the belief in the instrumental value 
of work. The trends suggest that people who 
believe in the notion that work should and will 
pay off did not take advantage of the possibil-
ity to free-ride on somebody else’s effort. They 
worked equally hard when working alone and 
when working with another when contribu-
tions were not identifi able. Participants who 
believed to a lesser extent in the instrumental 
value of work were affected by the social context. 
When it needed their individual effort to get the 
reward they worked much harder, compared to 
the situation in which they could free-ride on 
somebody else’s effort.
In sum, neither the sucker effect nor the free-
rider effect was moderated by the global con-
struct of PWE. However the sucker-effect seemed 
to be moderated in different ways by the three 
components of the PWE, namely the belief 
in the ethical value of work, the belief in the 
instrumental value of work and the endorsement 
of the equity principle. The free-rider effect, 
on the other hand, seems to be only marginally 
moderated by the belief in the instrumental 
value of work. 
Sucker and free-rider effects seem to be quali-
tatively different motivation losses in group per-
formance. The sucker-effect is moderated by 
beliefs about the instrumental and ethical value 
of work and preferences for equity, whereas these 
components tells us less about who is likely to 
free-ride. One potentially contributing difference 
between avoiding being the sucker and free-
riding is that avoiding the sucker role is a reaction 
to the behavior, anticipated or actual, of another 
person. In the experimental manipulation of the 
sucker-effect, the other person is giving the im-
pression that he is lowering their input because 
he does not feel like working hard. Consequently 
the participant sees the danger that he might 
be exploited, and the psychological cost of ex-
ploitation is higher than foregoing part of the 
monetary reward for high productivity. But 
these psychological costs are not experienced 
by everybody alike. More specifi cally, it is subject 
to individual differences that are bundled in the 
PWE construct. A high belief in the instrumental 
value of work makes you immune to the sucker-
effect. Thus, instrumental value seems to be 
a more self-focused belief in the long-range 
benefi ts of working hard and thus less responsive 
to the social context. A strong endorsement 
of the equity principle makes one particularly 
vulnerable to the sucker-effect. Seemingly, the 
psychological costs of exploitation are perceived 
as high by people who believe in equity, and 
thus they avoid being the sucker. Interestingly 
a strong belief in the ethical value of work also 
makes one especially vulnerable to the sucker 
effect, suggesting that the cost of compensating 
for another’s laziness is too costly. 
The free-rider effect does not seem to be 
affected so strongly by the PWE components. 
Although it appears that belief in the instrumental 
value of work may reduce free-riding, this 
evidence in our data is statistically weak. More-
over, we obtained no evidence that the ethical 
value and equity preference moderate free-
riding. One possible reason is that people may 
not be aware of the reduction of effort that we 
label free-riding. If they are not aware that they 
are working less hard in a collective effort, their 
beliefs about the work and equity may not be 
relevant. Moreover, it is clear that motivation 
loss in a free-rider situation is less of an affective 
reaction than in a sucker effect condition. From 
a certain perspective, free-riding seems rational. 
That is, reducing effort in team situations after 
getting joint feedback that the team is doing 
well could be an adaptive approach to collective 
endeavors. In the long run, it is functional to 
save one’s resources when they are apparently 
not needed for future endeavors when they 
may be needed. This strategy does not neces-
sarily contradict the ethical value of work.
In conclusion, we examined individual dif-
ferences in free-riding and sucker-effects in 
collective work. People who believe in equity and 
the ethical value of work are particularly sensitive 
to being the sucker and, thus, reduce their own 
effort rather than compensate for the laziness 
of a coworker. By comparison, people who be-
lieve that work should and will be rewarded in 
the long-run do not seem to react to being the 
sucker. There is also a tendency for these people 
who believe in the instrumental value of work 
to be less likely to free-ride. One implication is 
that belief in the instrumental value of work is 
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a guide for one’s own behavior: ‘If I work hard, 
I will be rewarded’. In contrast, both the ethical 
component of PWE and the equity norm are 
prescriptions not only about how one should 
act but also how one should react to others’ 
expenditures of effort in collective work.
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Appendix 
Items with high loadings on the fi rst factor (Ethical 
Factor):
1. Most people spend too much time in unprofi table 
amusement (Mirels & Garrett, 1971)
2. Our society would have fewer problems if people 
had less leisure time (Mirels & Garrett, 1971)
3. Most people who don’t succeed in life are just 
plain lazy (Mirels & Garrett, 1971)
4. A self-made person is likely to be more ethical 
than a person born to wealth (Mirels & Garrett, 
1971)
5. People should have more leisure time to spend in 
relaxation (r)1 (Mirels & Garrett, 1971)
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6. Life would be more meaningful if we had more 
leisure time (r) (Mirels & Garrett, 1971)
Items with high loadings on the second factor 
(Instrumental Factor):
1. Hard work is not a key to success (r) (Ho, 1984)
2. People who work deserve success (Ho, 1984)
3. There are few satisfactions equal to the realization 
that one has done one’s best at a job (Mirels & 
Garrett, 1971)
4. By working hard an individual can overcome most 
obstacles that life presents and make his or her 
own way in the world (Ho, 1984)
5. Nothing is impossible if you work hard enough 
(Ho, 1984)
6. If you work hard you will succeed (Ho, 1984)
7. The person who can approach an unpleasant 
task with enthusiasm is the one who gets ahead 
(Mirels & Garrett, 1971)
8. Hard work is fulfi lling in itself (Ho, 1984)
9. You should be best at what you do (Ho, 1984)
Items with high loadings on the third factor (Equity 
Factor):
1. When a task is completed by a team there is 
nothing wrong with distributing the reward equally 
regardless of unequal input (r)
2. The relative input of each team-member does not 
necessarily provide a legitimate basis for claiming 
differential rewards (r)
3. Rewards should be distributed to persons in direct 
proportion to their inputs (i.e. their relative 
contributions) 
4. The trouble with giving people equal rewards for 
work is that they very rarely work equally hard
5. If people work together on a task it is very important 
that the reward is distributed in proportion to the 
effort each puts in
 
1 (r) means that the scoring of the item is reversed.
